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Abstract 
Various theoretical explanations have been advanced with respect to why Nigeria ceded Bakassi peninsula to 
Cameroun after initial rejection of the verdict passed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 10th October, 
2002. The different arguments over the national interests that informed the ceding of the Bakassi peninsula to 
Cameroon, found expressions in the democratic-state theory, consequence theory, economic-aid theory, 
Deterrence theory, and the regime-type theory. Without prejudice to the postulations of the various theories, it is 
argued that though the identified variables all played out in Nigeria’s enforcement of the international court of 
Justice’s verdict, it seems to have been guided more by the consequence and the conspiracy theories. 
 
       Introduction 
The Nigeria-Cameroon conflict over Bakassi Penninsula which lingered for more than 30 years originated from 
the colonial partitioning of Africa characterised by series of ambiguities and irregularities in attempts to define 
the territorial boundary between the two countries (Dakas, 1999; Akpan, 2009). Attempts to determine the actual 
boundary between the two nations had often caused diplomatic rows and violent crises especially in the oil-rich 
peninsula which at times resulted in the loss of lives and property of the citizens (Aminu, 1986; Jimi and Aminu, 
1986). In 1982 for example, five Nigerian soldiers were killed at the border while the aborigines of Bakassi were 
severally attacked by the Cameroon Gendarmes (Vogt, 1986). In order to resolve the conflicts amicably, the two 
countries continually engaged in renewed discussions especially after the Maroua Declaration of 1975 signed by 
the then Head of State, Rtd. Gen. Yakubu Gowon which Cameroon believed, marked the ceding of Bakassi 
Penninsula to her (Dakas, 1999). However, mere discussions did not satisfy Cameroon’s quest to be in control as 
the aborigines who are Nigerians continued to occupy the area. This seriously troubled Cameroon and eventually 
compelled the government to take the border dispute with Nigeria to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 
March 29, 1994. On 10th October 2002, the Court sitting at Hague gave its verdict to mark the end of the 8-year 
legal tussle in favour of Cameroon. The verdict required Nigeria to transfer possession and sovereignty over the 
territory to Cameroon without granting Self-Determination Rights to the Bakassi indigenes (Omoigui, 2002; Eke 
and Eke, 2007).  
 
As a consequence, Nigeria lost 35 communities to Cameroon while the indigenes were displaced (Omoigui, 
2002; Yusufu, 2003). This generated consternations in Nigeria and aroused vitriolic comments from scholars, 
journalists, and commentators who not only described it as an invaluable loss of territorial integrity to the nation, 
but also as being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience against the Bakassi people. Because of 
the criticisms that trailed the judgement, Nigeria initially refused to withdraw its troops from the area and 
hesitated in transferring sovereignty to Cameroon; neither did the government openly reject the ruling (Mulu, 
2004; Jibril, 2004). Instead, the Nigerian government called for an agreement that would provide peace with 
honour and considerations for the welfare and security of the Bakassi people (Eke and Eke, 2007). In view of 
this, the Green Tree Agreement which was reached in New York City obliged both countries to periodically and 
jointly assess the conditions of the affected Nigerian population in the area and provide them with adequate 
assistance to ameliorate their sufferings (Eke and Eke, 2007). 
 
Meanwhile, the judgement opened avenues and opportunities to search for other diplomatic alternatives to 
address some extra-judicial issues that trailed the enforcement process especially as it affects the welfare and 
security of the Bakassi people. But amidst the controversies associated with ICJ’s verdict, the Nigerian 
government went ahead to enforce the ruling even without ratification by the National Assembly, and did not 
border to explore other diplomatic measures. 
 
The critical issue which has remained a puzzle to the researcher is why the Nigerian government despite her 
resolve not to cede an inch of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon in the name of national interest later enforced 
the verdict, and evacuated the Bakassi people from their ancestral homeland against the popular opinions of 
Nigerians. It should be noted that whereas the National Assembly kicked against the enforcement of the verdict 
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because the Green Tree Agreement which facilitated the ceding was not ratified by the legislature as provided in 
Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution (Ameh, 2012); the Federal High Court ruled that the enforcement process 
should be delayed until all resettlement accommodations for the displaced Bakassians are properly put in place 
(Yusufu, 2003); while the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) declared the ceding as illegal and unconstitutional 
(NBA, 2012). The Bakassi people on their part opposed being transferred to Cameroon and threatened to secede 
if Nigeria renounced its sovereignty over their subjects (Soni, 2012). Regardless of all these submissions, the 
Federal Government went ahead to enforce the ruling and formally transferred sovereignty over Bakassi 
Peninsula to Cameroon on 14th August, 2008. In this light, scholars have made several efforts to offer theoretical 
explanations on why Nigeria enforced the verdict despite earlier resolve not to part with Bakassi Peninsula. 
Hence, the central concern here is to critically review the various theoretical explanations proffered by different 
scholars as the theoretical basis for Nigeria’s enforcement of the International Court of Justice’s Verdict over 
Bakassi Peninsula. This study therefore examines the following theoretical viewpoints: democratic-state theory, 
consequence theory, economic aid theory, deterrence theory, regime-type theory, and conspiracy theory. 
Democratic-State theorists Perspective 
The democratic-state theorists advanced four main propositions anchored on the ethics and values of democracy 
as being responsible for Nigeria’s decision to cede Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon. The democratic state 
propositions derived from the writings of Orji (2012), Dayo (2012), Gadzama (2008). They argued as follows: 
first, that the international democratic order, of which Nigeria and other African states have accepted, compelled 
the Nigerian government to pursue the international norms of peace and non-violent resolution of inter-state 
disputes (Orji, 2012); second, that a rejection of the ICJ ruling would have contradicted Nigeria’s posture as a 
leading democratic nation and credibility as a vanguard of peace in Africa (Orji, 2012); third, that non-
compliance could call into question Nigeria’s acclaimed commitment to the rule of law, which is a vital 
condition for the superlative performance of democracy (Dayo, 2012); fourth, that non-compliance to the verdict 
and resorting to full scale war with Cameroon would further truncate Nigeria’s nascent democracy given the 
propensity for military-takeover under the guise the civilians’ incompetence to prosecute war (Dayo, 2012). 
These postulations sound very true to some extents but are not reflected in the realities of Nigeria’s internal 
democracy. For instance, if there were objectivity in the argument for Nigeria’s pursuit of “international norms 
of peace and non-violent resolution of inter-state dispute”, “being a leading democratic nation and a vanguard of 
peace in Africa”, “commitment to the rule of law”, and, “the survival of the nascent democracy against military 
takeover”, there should have been more serious efforts to truncate the anormalies bedevilling the country’s 
internal deomcracy. This is because it is only a functional internal democracy can project a reputable political 
image in the international community and not a pretended image-making process that undermines national 
interests. The nation’s internal democratic process is still characterised by the vices which the democratic-state 
theorists contend that the government did not want the international community perceive about Nigeria; such 
vices include hostilities and violence, violation of the rule of law, and electoral malpractices. Hence, it is vital to 
note that a nation deficient of internal democracy cannot export or showcase it in the international community.   
 
The Economic Aid Theorists Perspective 
The economic aid theory argues that Nigeria ceded Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon because of other economic 
interests perceived to be higher and consequential for the country in the international community. As enunciated 
in the works of Akinyemi (2002), Egbo (2003), Fawole (2003), Akinterinwa (2007), Alli (2007), Agbu (2008), 
Eke (2009), and Aja (2009), Nigeria’s economic interests largely revolve around (a) national economic recovery 
and diversified development (b) improved economic well-being of the Nigerian citizens (c) ensuring conducive 
economic conditions in Africa and the world to foster Nigeria’s national self-reliance (d) promoting sustainable 
trade and investment (e) maintaining stable financial system and debt crisis management (f) job creation and 
poverty alleviation. In pursuing these national economic interests, the Nigerian government anchored their 
efforts on economic diplomacy defined as the management of international relations in such a manner as to give 
topmost priority to the economic objectives of a nation through the application of economic measures or 
instruments in negotiating and bargaining with other countries either to control, distribute, or redistribute scarce 
resources (Asobie, 2002; Ogwu, 2002; Eke, 2009). In this light, securing debt relief from the International 
Monetary Fund was seen as part of major efforts to achieve the identified economic interests which would be 
difficult if Nigeria were to flout the judgement of the ICJ. This is because most of the external creditors 
especially the Paris Club of France have significant roles and influence to wield in the debt relief debates and the 
world bodies. Thus, given the earlier declaration of the then president Olusegun Obasanjo that Nigeria needs to 
take the centre-globe and canvass her economic interests in the international community, attention was focused 
more on pleasing the structures, mechanisms, and institutions that allocate world resources. Consequently, such 
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institutions as the World Bank, IMF, the G-77, the creditor clubs (London and Paris), as well as multinational 
institutions like the UN, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and International Court of Justice (ICJ) became 
essential determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy in order to secure the debt relief which some believed would 
salvage the nation’s economy from distress (Alli, 2007; Orji, 2012). The rationale for this presumed paradigm 
shift was to utilise the identified international structures, mechanisms, and institutions to advance Nigeria’s 
national economic interests parcelled in the quest for equity, social justice, and national development (Eke, 
2009). Hence, disobeying the judgment of the ICJ was therefore seen as obstacle to the diplomatic advances of 
the then President Olusegun Obasanjo and minister of finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala for the debt relief of $18 
billion which would not augur well with the political economy of Nigeria (Onwuamaeze, 2012). Although the 
debt relief was eventually secured, no significant positive effects have been observed in the economic 
development of the country; besides, the foreign debt of the country has started rising again after the purported 
relief (Debt Management Office, 2014). 
 
The Deterrence theorists Perspective  
The deterrence theory postulated that Nigeria ceded Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon out of fear that the latter’s 
military pact with France would give them undue strategic advantage if they go into confrontation. Within the 
context of international relations, deterrence means the possession and demonstration of military powers to 
discourage an actual or potential enemy from nursing any intent of aggression for fear of losing rather than 
gaining or prevailing in the pursuit of national interests (Karen, 1999). The deterrence theorists postulated that 
Nigeria was discouraged from going into confrontation with Cameroon because it was conscious of the fact that 
any aggressive action would be countered by a damaging reaction with the help of France. It is worthy of note 
that Nigeria’s national security is under serious threats in the West African sub-region because it is surrounded 
by francophone countries that are politically loyal, economically subservient, and militarily linked with France, 
the former colonialist (Nwankwo, 2007; Shindi, 2007). Given Nigeria’s international border dispute with each of 
the four neighbouring francophone countries (Benin Republic, Cameroun, Chad, and Niger Republic), it would 
not be difficult for France to mobilize the military alliances and supports of these countries against Nigeria as 
they did during the Nigerian Civil War (Biafran War)  (Eke and Eke, 2007). This fear was manifested in the 
earlier struggle to outmanoeuvre opponents in which France dispatched 30 paratroopers armed with light 
machine guns, combat helicopters; as well as mounted surface to air missiles, surface-to-surface artillery pieces, 
battery and radar stations to monitor sea and air movement of Nigerian troops in South-Western Cameroon and 
Bakassi (Eke and Eke, 2007). This was a rapid mission to assist its former colony in the deepening crisis. France 
argued that it was deeply concerned about the tension surrounding the conflicting claims to Bakassi peninsula. 
This fear is further increased by porosity of the Gulf of Guinea which is only 750 kilometres away from 
Nigeria’s shoreline, harbours our coastal waters stretching from the contiguous zone to the exclusive economic 
zone, but infested with high degree of piracy leading to notorious arms proliferation (Akinyemi, 2004). In order 
to douse the effects of these threats on national security, the Nigerian government was compelled to employ 
various foreign policy measures to ensure its safety. Part of these safety measures arguably includes Nigeria’s 
foreign policy decisions to spearhead the formation of ECOWAS as well as promote good neighbourliness part 
of which is the decision to cede Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon instead of going to war (Ngang, 2007). The 
assertion of the deterrence theorists holds sway to the extent of France’s support for Cameroon because Nigeria 
appears to have more power resources than the former. Nevertheless, even if France backs Cameroon, the 
regional strategic relevance of Nigeria to the western powers could have been advantageous for her to mobilize 
some international support as well.  
 
The Regime-Type theorists Perspective    
The regime-type theory shares the postulation that the government ceded Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon due to 
the character of Nigeria’s ruling elite during the Obasanjo administration most of whom perceived the ICJ ruling 
as the most civilized means of dealing with the Bakassi issue (Orji, 2012). In this line of argument, two types of 
regimes were identified: responsible regime and radical regime (Waltz, 1981). While the responsible regimes 
acknowledge the consequences of war and as such, seek peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue, 
negotiation, and legal means; a radical regime is bent on achieving its stated national interests by all possible 
means including war with little or no regards for stability in international peace and security (Waltz, 1981). The 
regime-type theorists therefore hold that Nigeria ceded Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon because the ruling elites 
have a sense of responsibility to maintain stability, peace, and security at both the domestic and international 
environments (Akinyemi, 2012). It was noted that even though the legal suite was filed in 1994, the radical 
military regime of late General Sani Abacha did not give way for peaceful resolution of the conflict; but in the 
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presence of responsible democratic regimes, it behoved on the ruling elites to uphold the verdict of ICJ as the 
most civilized approach to resolving the conflict (Dayo, 2012). This theoretical postulation goes further to 
explain why Olusegun Obasanjo who vehemently opposed Cameroon’s claim over the Bakassi Peninsula as a 
military head of state eventually ceded the area as a civilian president. In a sense, as a Military Head of State in a 
radical regime, Olusegun Obasanjo was under serious obligation to protect the nation’s territorial integrity 
against all odds; but he thought it was worthwhile to behave as a responsible regime of a civilised nation in 
contemporary period. Hence, though the National Assembly declined to implement the Green Tree Agreement 
under section 12 of the Constitution thereby depriving it of any force of law domestically, this does not in any 
way void the international obligation of a responsible regime to obey the verdict: first, under the ICJ judgement 
of October 2002; and second, under the Green Tree Agreement (Egede, 2008). 
 
The Consequence theorists Perspective           
The consequence theory postulated that Nigeria rescinded its decision to reject the verdict of ICJ and ceded 
Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon because of the anticipated negative consequences in the international system. In 
line with this argument, first, it is contended that non-compliance with the verdict could incur the wrath of the 
UN Security Council. Under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, if any party to a case fails to perform the 
obligation incumbent upon it under a judgment referred by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the 
Security Council (Dayo, 2012). If the Security Council deems it necessary, it may make recommendations or 
decide measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. Under article 25 of the Charter, the members of the 
UN agreed to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council; and still in chapter II of the Charter, the 
Security Council can impose sanctions, and where necessary, authorise enforcement against a State whose 
actions or omissions threaten or lead to breaches of international peace and security. Hence, in seeking the 
intervention of the Security Council, Cameroon could easily count on the support and influence of France which 
is a permanent member of the Council. Second, if Nigeria had failed to comply, it would have risked being shut 
out should it seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in subsequent cases, as no court would readily grant 
audience to a country that flouts the ICJ’s orders (Dayo, 2012). Third, non-compliance on the part of Nigeria 
could undermine her contributions and impact at other international law bodies such as the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), and the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) where Justice Adolphus Karibi-Whyte of 
Nigeria had once served as a Judge with respect to an issue that affected Yugoslavia. Fourth, non-compliance to 
the verdict could jeopardise the chances of Nigerian candidate for the judgeship of the Court where distinguished 
Nigerians like T.O. Elias, Daddy Onyeama, and Bola Ajibola had served meritoriously on the Court’s Bench 
(Dayo, 2012). It is therefore notable that even though the National Assembly may decline to implement the 
Green Tree Agreement under section 12 of the Constitution thereby depriving it of any force of law 
domestically, this does not in any way void the international obligation of Nigeria, firstly, under the ICJ 
judgement of October 2002 and secondly, under the Green Tree Agreement. It is noted that the ICJ judgement 
imposed an international obligation upon Nigeria to comply with them as a member of the United Nations, and a 
party to the United Nations Charter as well as the Statute of the ICJ (an integral part of the Charter) (Egede, 
2008). Under Article 94(1) of the UN Charter and article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ: “ Each Member of the 
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which 
it is a party.” In cases where a party to the case fails to perform its obligations under the judgement of the ICJ, 
the other party (in this case Cameroon) may have recourse to the Security Council which may , under the powers 
granted to it by article 94(2) of the Charter, impose sanctions on the recalcitrant State. In reality, no State has so 
far utilised the recourse to the Security Council to enforce the judgement of the ICJ, it is therefore not advisable 
for Nigeria to expose itself to the possibility of this happening (Egede, 2008). Nigeria would find it difficult to 
scale through the sanctions of the UN especially because three permanent members of the Security Council (the 
United States of America, United Kingdom and France) were amongst the witness-States to the Green Tree 
Agreement (Egede, 2008). Furthermore, under article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a 
party to a treaty like the Green Tree Agreement, “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty”. In essence, the fact that the National Assembly has failed to 
domesticate the Green Tree Agreement will not void Nigeria’s international obligation under this treaty (Egede, 
2008). In addition, it is pertinent to mention here Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
which states that a party to a treaty “may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating 
its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental 
importance”. The proviso to this article would not avail for Nigeria because, as mentioned earlier, the consent of 
President Obasanjo to the Green Tree Agreement without the ratification of the National Assembly is a valid 
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consent under the internal laws of Nigeria, as it presently stands (Egede, 2008). Thus, if Nigeria failed to heed 
these rules of international engagements, it could be returned to a pariah state and undermine the credibility of its 
candidature for a permanent member seat in an expanded/reformed UN Security Council (Dayo, 2012). Though 
the veracity of the consequence theorists’ postulations is not in doubt, it is observable that where state-actors 
have obeyed the decisions of the ICJ were more or less on issues of secondary interests and issues that friendly 
relations supersede (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011). In other words, where a state has the power resources to 
beat the possible application of the reciprocity and collective response principles, the verdicts of the ICJ may be 
disobeyed especially if core interests are at stake (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2011).  
 
Conspiracy theorists Perspective 
The conspiracy theory was first used in 1909 in “The American Historical Review”. The major proponents 
include Pipes (1992), Goertzel (1994), Barkun (2003), Knight (2003), Walker (2013), West and Sanders (2003), 
Fenster (2008), Young (2010). The conspiracy theory is an explanatory proposition that accuses two or more 
persons, a group or an organisation of having caused or covered up through secret planning and deliberate action, 
an illegal or harmful event or situation (Goertzel, 1994; Knight, 2003). Sharing similar view, Barkun (2003) 
postulated that a conspiracy theory is a belief which explains an event as the result of a secret plot by 
exceptionally powerful and cunning conspirators to achieve a malevolent end. While expanding the details of the 
conspiracy theory, Young (2010), asserted "every real conspiracy has had at least four characteristic features: 
groups, not isolated individuals; illegal or sinister aims, not ones that would benefit society as a whole; 
orchestrated acts, not a series of spontaneous and haphazard ones; and secret planning, not public discussion". 
The views of these scholars suggests that in conspiracy, some groups are included while others are excluded in 
the secret Plan; as such, there is an ulterior motive unknown and not to be made known, to the general public and 
that is why public opinion won’t be sought; also, the benefits of the plan won’t reach all but the core plotters. 
The proponents contend that for conspiracy to be successful, there must be external enemies and internal agents 
to perfect the secret plan.  
 
Eke and Eke (2007) adopted the conspiracy theory to explain the verdict of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ)  over Bakassi Peninsula and Nigeria’s enforcement of the judgment. Eke and Eke (2007) explained the 
verdict as a neo-colonial conspiracy hatched to sustain the claimed superiority and influence of the western 
powers over their former colonies. In efforts to maintain their neo-colonial relevance in the region, France, 
Britain, Germany, and the United States of America backed reliance on colonial Anglo-German agreement 
reached in 1913 as the basis for Judgment in 2002 thereby ignoring the principles of effective occupation and 
ancestral heritage recognized in the UN Charter. The conspiracy did not end with the neo-colonial powers 
(external enemies), they also collaborated with the internal agents (some Nigerian political elites) who have 
vested international capitalist interests to protect. Thus, the neo-colonial powers and international capitalist elites 
conspired with the internal capitalist oriented political elites to dispossess the Bakassi people of their economic 
resources in their own common interests. Meanwhile, the argument of the conspiracy theorists is that: first, the 
western powers sought to maintain their claims of superiority over their former colonies; second, in order to 
perfect the intention, they collaborated with the national political elites on the platform of shared international 
capitalist interests to be protected in the course of exploiting the oil resources in the Bakassi Peninsula.  
 
Conclusion 
The theoretical expositions made so far highlighted the diverse explanatory viewpoints shared by scholars on 
why Nigeria enforced the verdict of the International Court of Justice. While the postulations of the democratic-
state theory does not suffice because Nigeria cannot pretend to offer the values of democracy lacking in the 
nation’s polity; the assertions of the economic aid theory is still deficient to the extent that the debt relief granted 
with the attendant benefits cannot be equated with the territorial loss and the resources therein. More so, the 
deterrence theorists was unable to give substantial explanations because Nigeria’s military resources is not such 
that can easily be deterred by Cameroon and/or France. In terms of the regime-type theory, it should be noted 
that the regimes which ceded Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon, were not as responsible as argued, else the 
governments could have quickly and adequately responded to the plight of the displaced Bakassi people. 
Meanwhile, Nigeria’s enforcement of the ICJ’s verdict was propelled more by the implications and 
consequences of flouting the judgment; in order to avoid the anticipated consequences and explore the benefits, 
the actors that were directly involved, conspired and ceded the area without involving the affected population. 
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